Upon checking my really outdated mail, I came across someone by the name of Gregory Koukl discussing Euthyphro’s dilemma from a Christian point of view.
The dilemma: ‘Is an act right because God says it’s so, or does God say it is so because the act is right?’
So who comes first? The absolute nature of morality or the sovereignty of the Lord?
He quotes Plato:
In Plato’s dialogue between Socrates and Euthyphro, Socrates is
attempting to understand the essence of piety and holiness:
Socrates: And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro? Is not piety,
according to your definition, loved by all the gods?
Euthyphro: Certainly.
Socrates: Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason?
Euthyphro: No, that is the reason.
Socrates: It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?
And goes on to say that, much nearer to our times, this has been ‘revamped’ into an assault on Christianity by Bertrand Russell in his work, ‘Why I am not a Christian’:
If you are quite sure there is a difference between right and wrong,
you are then in this situation: Is that difference due to God’s fiat or
is it not? If it is due to God’s fiat, then for God Himself there is no
difference between right and wrong, and it is no longer a significant
statement to say that God is good. If you are going to say, as
theologians do, that God is good, you must then say that right and
wrong have some meaning which is independent of God’s fiat, because
God’s fiats are good and not good independently of the mere fact that
he made them. If you are going to say that, you will then have to say
that it is not only through God that right and wrong came into being,
but that they are in their essence logically anterior to God.
[italics my own]
Koukl goes on to talk about ethical voluntarism, a view that, in my understanding of it, says that God’s commands are absolute and morality is decreed by God (an act is right because God says it is.) Or more precisely,
‘Ethicist Scott Rae describes the view: “A divine command theory of
ethics is one in which the ultimate foundation for morality is the
revealed will of God, or the commands of God found in Scripture.”‘
The problems with such a view:
1. morality is arbitrary – just what God decides. What is moral today (in a most extreme case), can, merely by God’s whim, become what is immoral tomorrow.
2. reduces God’s goodness to his power. It would appear that ‘for God Himself there is no difference between right and wrong’ (Russell).
The other view, that God says the act is so because it is right, takes away God’s supremacy because he is subject to a higher law.
So how? I wondered.
Plato’s challenge forces us to consider grounding – the logical basis for a claim – in a discussion on the nature of morality. Koukl, to me, seems to digress at this point because he goes on to state that grounding becomes problematic for atheists. Working on the assumption that ‘A law is only as legitimate as the authority upon which it rests’ (something that I subscribe to too, but I classify as an assumption because somehow it appears more like an opinion than dead hard fact. Well I don’t know I haven’t delved deep enough into this) it would appear that an atheist has no suitable grounds for morality if being moral is to ‘comply with an
objective standard of good, a Law given by legitimate authority… without a transcendent Lawmaker (God), there can be no transcendent Law, and no corresponding obligation to be good’.
I think I like what Trappist monk Thomas Merton (also quoted by Koukl) said better:
‘In the name of whom or what do you ask me to behave? Why should I go to
the inconvenience of denying myself the satisfactions I desire in the
name of some standard that exists only in your imagination? Why should
I worship the fictions that you have imposed on me in the name of
nothing?’
Something I used before in my own words to illustrate my stand on how, without God, I myself feel there’s no grounds for morality and I can basically commit as many immoral acts as I want. It troubled the other party whom I was explaining it to.
Back to Euthyphro’s dilemma, Koukl proposes a solution. Here’s what he said about dilemmas:
‘The general strategy used to defeat a dilemma is to show that it’s a
false one. There are not two options, but three.’
And the solution?
‘The third option is that an objective standard exists (this avoids the
first horn of the dilemma). However, the standard is not external to
God, but internal (avoiding the second horn). Morality is grounded in
the immutable character of God, who is perfectly good. His commands are
not whims, but rooted in His holiness.’
And a more practical illustration:
‘Could God simply decree that torturing babies was moral? “No,” the
Christian answers, “God would never do that.” It’s not a matter of
command. It’s a matter of character.’
I like this quote by Scott Rae as it pretty much sums up what is said:
“Morality is not grounded ultimately in God’s commands, but in His character, which then
expresses itself in His commands.”
Yet that doesn’t solve the problem, because to say that goodness is ‘in accord with God’s character’ would seem to pave the way for a second problem; that when the bible says that God is good it simply means that ‘God has the nature and character that God has’, thereby reducing the saying that ‘God is good’ to a useless tautology.
This is Koukl’s answer:
‘God is not good in the same way that a bachelor is an unmarried male. When we say God is good, we are giving additional information, namely that God has a certain quality. God is not the very same thing as goodness (identical to it). It’s an essential characteristic of God, so there is no tautology.’
[italics my own]